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LIBRARY

Chain library.

INFLUENCE

Prompt injection to tool misuse

Hidden directives in user input become attacker-chosen tool parameters before any policy check fires.

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INFLUENCE

Poisoned retrieved context

A planted document is ranked highly and treated as authoritative evidence for a high-impact decision.

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INFLUENCE

Hidden instruction in document ingestion

Concealed directives inside ingested documents override policy and invoke tools the user never asked for.

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ACTION

Code-execution side effects

Visible output looks fine while filesystem writes, network calls, and leaked secrets quietly accumulate.

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AUTHORITY

Credential overreach

An over-broad token is reused to invoke an unrelated tool, expanding impact beyond the user's intent.

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STATE

Memory poisoning

A poisoned fact written in one session is later retrieved as trusted state and shapes a future decision.

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CAPABILITY

Unsafe MCP / tool extension

A capability added without registry review or scope check opens a path to high-impact downstream actions.

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PROPAGATION

Agent-to-agent contamination

One agent's manipulated output flows through orchestration into another agent that treats it as trusted input.

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GOVERNANCE

Fake approval loop

A polished summary hides the real tool parameters and diff, so the human approves a sentence, not the action.

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GOVERNANCE

Workflow automation abuse

Many in-policy steps compose into broad effective authority and an irreversible action no single step would allow.

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TEMPLATE

Attack chain template

The standard template every chain in this library is built from.

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